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Abstract
Background: The 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza dynamics in Italy was characterized by a notable pattern: as it emerged
from the analysis of influenza-like illness data, after an initial period (September–mid-October 2009) characterized by a slow
exponential increase in the weekly incidence, a sudden and sharp increase of the growth rate was observed by mid-
October. The aim here is to understand whether spontaneous behavioral changes in the population could be responsible
for such a pattern of epidemic spread.
Methodology/Principal Findings: In order to face this issue, a mathematical model of influenza transmission, accounting
for spontaneous behavioral changes driven by cost/benefit considerations on the perceived risk of infection, is proposed
and validated against empirical epidemiological data. The performed investigation revealed that an initial overestimation of
the risk of infection in the general population, possibly induced by the high concern for the emergence of a new influenza
pandemic, results in a pattern of spread compliant with the observed one. This finding is also supported by the analysis of
antiviral drugs purchase over the epidemic period. Moreover, by assuming a generation time of 2.5 days, the initially diffuse
misperception of the risk of infection led to a relatively low value of the reproductive number 1:24, which increased to 1:48
in the subsequent phase of the pandemic.
Conclusions/Significance: This study highlights that spontaneous behavioral changes in the population, not accounted by
the large majority of influenza transmission models, can not be neglected to correctly inform public health decisions. In fact,
individual choices can drastically affect the epidemic spread, by altering timing, dynamics and overall number of cases.
Citation: Poletti P, Ajelli M, Merler S (2011) The Effect of Risk Perception on the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Influenza Dynamics. PLoS ONE 6(2): e16460. doi:10.1371/
journal.pone.0016460
Editor: Benjamin Cowling, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Received September 29, 2010; Accepted December 17, 2010; Published February 7, 2011
Copyright:  2011 Poletti et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work was funded by the European Union FP7 FLUMODCONT and EPIWORK projects. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and
analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: ajelli@fbk.eu
Introduction
Among the many factors known to influence the spread of
epidemics across human populations, a central role is played by
the characteristics of the pathogen responsible for the infections
[1,2], human mobility patterns [3–8], the sociodemographic
structure of the population [8,9] and intervention measures
[1,10]. Changes in human behaviors are largely suspected to play
a crucial role as well [11–15]. As mathematical modeling becomes
a powerful tool for decision making both in pre-planning [16–25]
and in real-time situations [26–30], knowing in advance how to
account for spontaneous behavioral changes would greatly
improve the predictive power of epidemic transmission models
and the evaluation of the effectiveness of control strategies.
In March 2009 a new influenza virus emerged in Mexico [31].
Early in the course of the pandemic the population was very
concerned about the event [32,33]. Did this affect the behavior of
the population and, consequently, alter the dynamics of the
epidemic? By analyzing the 2009–2010 Influenza-Like Illness (ILI)
incidence in Italy, as reported to the national surveillance system,
the hypothesis appears plausible that spontaneous behavioral
changes have played a role in the pandemic, contributing to
change the timing of spread and the transmissibility potential. In
fact, after an initial period (September–mid-October 2009)
characterized by a slow exponential increase in the weekly ILI
incidence, a sudden and sharp increase of the growth rate was
observed by mid-October. Over the whole period schools
remained open [34] and only moderate mitigation measures were
enacted (e.g., antiviral treatment of severe cases) [35]. However,
during the initial phases of the epidemic the Italian population has
been exposed to a massive information campaign on the risks of an
emerging influenza pandemic, which can have contributed to alter
the perceived risk. The aim of this study is to investigate the effects
of the perceived risk of infection during the course of the 2009
H1N1 pandemic in Italy.
Here, we propose a new modeling framework accounting
explicitly for the dynamics of behavioral patterns adopted across
the population. The idea is that human behavior is mainly driven
by the evaluation of prospective outcomes deriving from
alternative decisions and cost-benefit considerations. In such a
context, evolutionary game theory represents a rich and natural
framework for modeling human behavioral changes [36–38].
Specifically, different behaviors adopted by individuals are
modeled as different strategies whose convenience is defined by
the balance between their payoff functions. In evolutionary game
theory, due to the dynamic nature of the mechanisms of evolution,
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provide insights into adaptive behaviors [37–40]. In epidemic
modeling, this results in explicitly considering the infection
dynamics as the interplay between the disease transmission process
and the spontaneous response of the population, where changes in
human behavior (and in particular in the payoff functions) are
triggered by the epidemic dynamics and vice versa.
Materials and Methods
Data description
In Italy, influenza surveillance system INFLUNET (accessible
at: http://www.iss.it/iflu/) is based on a nationwide voluntary
sentinel network of general practitioners and pediatricians. The
aim is to monitor ILI incidence and to collect information on
circulating strains. Incidence rates are based on the population
served by each reporting physician each week.
As most European countries, Italy has experienced one single
pandemic wave during fall-winter 2009 and no substantial activity
has been detected during the summer [30]. The pandemic has
mainly spread starting since the reopening of schools in mid-
September until mid-December. Over this period, only mild
mitigation strategies, including treatment of the most severe cases
with antiviral drugs [35] and a moderate vaccination program,
were performed. More in detail, the vaccination program started
on mid-October and involved a small fraction of at-risk patients
and essential workers (over the whole course of the pandemic less
than 1.5% of the Italian population was vaccinated [35]). Finally,
in the considered period, schools remained open as regular
holidays were not scheduled [34].
We consider total ILI incidence from week 38 (corresponding to
the reopening of schools after the summer break, when influenza
activity started to be detected by the surveillance system) to 50, 2009.
This allows us to investigate an ‘‘uncontrolled’’ epidemic, not affected
by heavy public health interventions or by school closure. The
number of practitioners involved in the surveillance system over the
considered period varies from 561 to 1,165; consequently, the served
population varies from 767,154 and 1,509,971. These values
guarantee the reliability of the number of weekly reported cases.
The model
The transmission process is based on a Susceptible-Infective-
Recovered (SIR) model where susceptible individuals may adopt
two mutually exclusive behaviors, ‘‘normal’’ and ‘‘altered’’, on the
basis of the perceived risk of infection. Individuals adopting altered
behavior are supposed to be able to reduce the risk of infection by
reducing the force of infection to which they are exposed. This
reduction can be achieved by reducing the number (or the type) of
physical contacts or by adopting self-prophylactic measures aimed
to reduce the transmission probability during contacts. For
instance, a self reduction in the number of contacts can occur
through the avoidance of crowded environments or by limiting
travels. On the other hand, a reduction in transmission probability
can be achieved by washing hands frequently or following cough/
respiratory etiquette, as recommended by the WHO [41].
In the model, individuals can change their behavior spontane-
ously, on the basis of cost/benefit considerations. This phenom-
enon perfectly fits to the language of evolutionary game theory, in
which behaviors adopted by individuals correspond to strategies
played in a suitable game, with certain expected payoffs: the altered
behavior takes the advantage of reducing the risk of infection, but
it is more costly (e.g., because individuals have to limit their
activities). Which behavior is more convenient to adopt clearly
depends on the state of the epidemic. The balance of the payoff
between the two possible behaviors is determined by the perceived
risk of infection, which depends on the cost associated to the risk of
infection and on the perceived prevalence of infections in the
population. The latter is modeled by assuming a fading memory
mechanism (e.g., as in [42,43]) altering the perception of the risk of
infection on the basis of the number of cases occurred over a
certain (past) period of time. The diffusion of strategies in the
population is modeled as an imitation process [38,44] based on the
idea that individuals change strategy as they become aware that
their payoff can increase by adopting another behavior. Denoting
by S, I, R the fraction of susceptible, infective and recovered
individuals respectively and by introducing the variables x,
describing the fraction of individuals adopting the normal behavior,
and M, describing the perceived prevalence of infection in the
population, the system of ordinary differential equations regulating
this process can be written as follows:
_ S S ~{ bIS xzq(1{x) ½ 
_ I I ~ bIS xzq(1{x) ½  {cI
_ R R ~ cI
_ M M ~ bIS xzq(1{x) ½  {hM
_ x x ~ x(1{x)(q{1)bIzrx(1{x)(1{mM)S
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
where b is the transmission rate; 1=c is the average duration of
infectivity period (corresponding to the generation time); q
represents the reduction of the risk of infection to which
individuals adopting altered behavior are exposed; h weighs the
decay of the perceived prevalence; r essentially represents the
speed of the imitation process with respect to the pathogen
transmission dynamics; m defines the risk threshold for determin-
ing which behavior would represent the most convenient choice.
Briefly, the last equation of the system models the diffusion of the
two different behaviors in the population driven by an imitation/
natural selection process. The first term of the equation accounts for
a natural selection embedded into the transmission process that
favors individuals reducing the risk of infection, while the second
one accounts for an imitation process modeling spontaneous
changes in individual behaviors. These changes occur on the basis
of the difference between the payoffs of the two possible behaviors,
the perceived prevalence, the level of the risk threshold and the
speed ofthe imitationprocess which, ingeneral, is different from the
speed of the disease transmission process (as imitation is based on
the diffusion of information rather than on physical contacts
between individuals). Model details are presented in Text S1.
The basic reproductive number R0, which is essentially the
average number of secondary infections that results from a single
infectious individual in a fully susceptible population [1], can be
computed by using next generation technique [45]. The resulting
basic reproductive number is R0~
b
c
xzq(1{x) ½  , which can be
interpreted as a weighted sum of two basic reproductive numbers:
Rn
0~
b
c
, the reproductive number for individuals adopting the
normal behavior (namely the fraction x) and Ra
0~q
b
c
, the
reproductive number for individuals adopting the altered behavior
(namely the fraction 1{x). Therefore, R0 depends on the fraction
of individuals in the population who are currently adopting either
normal or altered behavior.
Model calibration
In order to capture the factors underlying the spread of the 2009
H1N1 pandemic, we fit the proposed model to ILI incidence data
Risk Perception and 2009 H1N1 Pandemic
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predicted by model simulations can be computed as
JT~
Ð T
T{1 bI(t)S(t) x(t)zq(1{x(t)) ½  dt. Thus, for a given
choice of model parameters and of the reporting factor a, the
square error e between predicted and observed incidence can be
estimated as e~
P14
T~1 ZT{aJT ðÞ
2, where ZT represents the
weekly ILI incidence as reported to the Italian surveillance system
on week T (week T~0 corresponds to week 37, 2009). The
optimization procedure is a random walk stochastic local search
algorithm [46].
According to a serological survey on the Italian population, the
fraction of naturally immune individuals before the beginning of
the pandemic was about 10% [47]. Therefore, the initial fraction
of susceptible individuals in the model was set to S(0)~0:9. The
generation time is assumed 1=c~2:5 days [48–50]. Moreover, the
initial fraction of individuals adopting the altered behavior is
assumed to be x(0)~10{8 (i.e., almost the whole population is
initially adopting the normal behavior). Finally, given the
interdependence between M(0) and m (see the discussion in Text
S1), the value of m is kept fixed to 0.1. All other parameters
(namely, M(0),I(0),r,q,n, b and a) are estimated through the
least-squares fit. A detailed sensitivity analysis of the model is
presented in Text S1.
Two additional models are included in the performed analysis:
the ‘‘classical’’ SIR model and a SIR model assuming time-
dependent transmission rate, which is considered to be a step
function switching between two values at a given time. The initial
fraction of susceptible individuals and the generation time are kept
fixed (as in the model accounting for behavioral changes), while all
other parameters are estimated via model fit. Specifically, for the
SIR model the fitted parameters are the reporting factor, the initial
fraction of infective individuals and the transmission rate; for the
SIR model with time-dependent transmission rate the fitted
parameters are the reporting factor, the initial fraction of infective
individuals, two transmission rates and the time at which the
switch between these two values occurs.
Results
The ILI incidence as reported to the surveillance system during
the 2009 H1N1 pandemic shows two different phases character-
ized by two distinct exponential growth rates, especially apprecia-
ble when data are plotted in a logarithmic scale (see Fig. 1a and its
sub-panel). The ‘‘classical’’ SIR model is not able to catch this
phenomenon (see Fig. 1a) unless considering a time-dependent
transmission rate, switching from a low transmission level during
the first four weeks to a higher level for the rest of the epidemic (see
Fig. 1b). However, this model is not able to explain the motivation
underlying this sudden change in the transmissibility potential.
On the contrary, the model introduced here perfectly fits the
observed ILI incidence (see Fig. 1c) providing a plausible
explanation of the mechanisms responsible for the observed
pattern. Specifically, the estimated parameter configuration
obtained by fitting ILI incidence entails an initial overestimation
of the perceived risk that decreases over time, along with an initial
diffusion of the altered behavior in the population which becomes
replaced by the normal behavior during the course of the epidemic.
In fact, a high level of perceived risk of infection at the beginning
of the pandemic leads the simulated population to adopt the altered
behavior (as in the presence of a well sustained circulation of the
virus) resulting in a growth rate of the epidemic lower than what
would have been observed in a population adopting the normal
behavior. Along with a slow increase in the number of cases, a
decrease in the perceived risk of infection is observed. In fact, the
latter depends on the combination of these two opposite
phenomena: the increase of new infections and the decline of
the perceived prevalence (slowed by the memory mechanism),
which was overestimated in the early phases of the epidemic. As
Figure 1. Comparing observed ILI incidence and model simulations. a Weekly ILI incidence as reported to the surveillance system (green)
and weekly incidence simulated by a ‘‘simple’’ SIR model (blue). Sub-panel shows the same curves in a logarithmic scale. Parameter values assumed in
the simulation are: the generation time 1=c~2:5 days [48–50] and S(0)~0:9, according to a serological survey on the Italian population [47].
Parameter values estimated via model fit are: I(0)~0:000176, a~0:174 and b~0:58. b Weekly ILI incidence as reported to the surveillance system
(green) and weekly incidence simulated by a SIR model assuming a time-dependent transmission rate (blue). Sub-panel shows the same curves in a
logarithmic scale. Assumed parameters are: 1=c~2:5 days and S(0)~0:9. Values of the fitted parameters are: I(0)~0:00126, a~0:167, b(t)~0:496 for
weeks 38–41.58 and b(t)~0:596 for weeks 41.58–51. c Weekly ILI incidence as reported to the surveillance system (green) and weekly incidence
simulated by the proposed model (red). Sub-panel shows the same curves in a logarithmic scale. Assumed parameters are: 1=c~2:5 days, S(0)~0:9,
x(0)~10{8 and m~0:1. The values of the fitted parameters are: M(0)~10:5, I(0)~0:001243, r~66, q~0:84, n~0:005, a~0:169 and b~0:59.I n
addition, the estimates of the reporting factor a as obtained by fitting the three models and reported in a, b and c (namely, 17.4%, 16.7% and 16.9%,
respectively) are in good agreement with the range 18%–20.2% estimated in [30].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016460.g001
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normal behavior starts to spread quickly in the population as the
most convenient strategy to be adopted through the subsequent
course of the epidemic. This induces an increase of R0 which leads
to a sudden change in the growth rate of the epidemic. Thus, these
two distinct exponential growth phases in the observed ILI
incidence correspond to two phases in the model: the first one
characterized by the diffusion of the altered behavior in the
population and thus driven by Ra
0, and the second one
characterized by the diffusion of the normal behavior and thus
driven by Rn
0. The best estimate for Ra
0 is 1.24 and for Rn
0 is 1.48
(which correspond to two effective reproductive numbers of 1.12
and 1.33 respectively, given a 10% initial natural immunity to the
2009 H1N1pdm strain in the Italian population [47]). The basic
reproductive number estimated in the phase of the epidemic
characterized by the normal behavior, namely Rn
0, is in good
agreement with the estimates previously obtained for the
2009 pandemic in Italy [30] and in several regions of the world
[28,48–51].
The analysis of the sensibility of the model to changes in
parameter values highlights that the model complies with observed
ILI incidence only if an initial (persistent) diffusion of the altered
behavior in the population is considered (see Text S1). Specifically,
an initial perceived risk of infection above the risk threshold, a
long-lasting memory mechanism (able to maintain the altered
behavior as more convenient over a relevant period of time) and a
fast imitation process (enough to produce a sudden change in the
force of infection) are required. Moreover, model predictions are
robust in terms of final epidemic size (with absolute differences of
the order of 3%), while they are more sensible in terms of timing of
the epidemic. Specifically, small variations in the reduction of the
risk of infection in individuals adopting the altered behavior result in
changing Ra
0 and thus the timing of the epidemic. The same holds
if the initial perceived prevalence and the risk threshold
determining which behavior is more convenient to adopt are
perturbed. On the other hand, no relevant differences appear by
increasing either the average duration of the perceived risk of
infection (i.e., the length of the long-lasting memory mechanism)
or the speed of the imitation process. A further analysis (shown in
Text S1) has revealed that, if the risk of infection is overestimated
during the early phases of the epidemic, the diffusion of the virus
would be slowed down (thus gaining time for vaccine production).
On the other hand, if such overestimation occurs during the
outbreak, a lower peak incidence (and thus a lower burden for
health care centers) and a relevant decline of the final epidemic
size would be observed.
Results reported above support the hypothesis that the mass
media campaign on the risks of an emerging influenza pandemic
performed in the early phases of the epidemic might have induced
a high perceived risk of infection at the beginning of the pandemic,
as it has been highlighted by specific survey studies [32,33]. In
order to investigate if such phenomenon could have been a
peculiarity of the 2009 pandemic, we also analyzed the last three
influenza seasons in Italy. Our analysis, reported in Text S1,
reveals that during the 2006–2007, 2007–2008 and 2008–2009
influenza seasons behavioral changes would not have played a
relevant role in the early phases of the epidemics.
Beyond the previous analysis, the hypothesis of an overestima-
tion of the risk is supported by the temporal pattern of drug
purchases and by sporadic self-imposed school closures. Specifi-
cally, during the 2008–2009 influenza season the maximum
weekly number of antiviral drugs sold was under 2 doses per
100,000 individuals per week, while when the 2009 pandemic
arrived in Europe (end of April) antiviral drug purchases
immediately jumped to more than 12 doses per 100,000
individuals per week [52]. Despite no substantial ILI activity has
been detected in Italy during the summer, the purchase of antiviral
drugs reached a peak of about 35 doses per 100,000 individuals
per week at the end of July. As shown in Fig. 2a and 2b, during fall
the purchase of antiviral drugs complies with the observed ILI
temporal dynamics, while until mid-October an excess of antiviral
drug purchase can be observed, supporting the hypothesis of an
initial overestimation of the risk of infection. On the contrary, the
sales of pain killers (which are commonly used to relieve pain due
to mild symptoms) have followed a completely different pattern:
during the summer the sales have been (nearly) constant, then they
started to increase from the middle of September [52]. The
purchase of antiviral drugs might have been amplified by the
Figure 2. Risk perception, antivirals purchase and reporting factor. a Weekly purchase of antiviral drugs (light blue, scale on the left axis)
and weekly ILI incidence as reported to the surveillance system (green, scale on the right axis) during the 2009–2010 pandemic in Italy. b Light blue
points (scale on the left axis) represent the weekly excess of the purchase of antiviral drugs. The latter is defined as the difference between the actual
and the expected amount of antiviral drugs purchased (which is assumed to be proportional to ILI incidence, and the proportionality constant is
computed as the number of antivirals purchased divided by the ILI incidence averaged over weeks 43–51, i.e. in the period of sustained transmission).
Light blue line represents the best linear model fit to the excess of purchased antivirals. Horizontal black line represents the threshold over which the
number of antivirals purchased is larger than the expected one. Grey area represents the maximum and the minimum excess of antiviral drugs
purchased over the weeks 43–51. Red points (scale on the right axis) represent the perceived prevalence of infection simulated by the model
parameterized as in Fig. 1c. c Weekly reporting factor estimates that enable the simple SIR model (parameters as in Fig. 1a) to exactly fit the reported
ILI incidence. The horizontal gray line represents the average reporting factor as computed over the weeks 42–50.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016460.g002
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campaign about the use of antivirals for treating H1N1 infections.
Moreover, from the end of September to the beginning of
October, a few examples of reactive school closure have been
documented [53–56]. Such school closures were ‘‘self-imposed’’ by
the scholastic board or suggested by local authorities (at
municipality level). However, these sporadic closures can hardly
be thought as the only responsible for the low transmission
observed during the early phases of the epidemic. These two
examples, however, provide empirical evidence that a high risk for
the ongoing pandemic influenza has been perceived by the Italian
population and that individuals have actively performed sponta-
neous defensive response measures aimed to reduce the risk of
infection.
Behavioral changes, though not directly affecting the transmis-
sion process, can also be relevant from an epidemiological
perspective. For example, as well known by epidemiologists, a
high perceived risk during an epidemic can increase the
notification rate, especially if the surveillance system is based on
consultations. However, such phenomenon does not seem to be
able to explain (alone) the observed pattern. In fact, a simple SIR
model, with a time-dependent reporting factor, can capture ILI
incidence during the initial phase of H1N1 pandemic only by
considering extremely large values of the reporting factor (even
above 100%, see Fig. 2c). Similar results have been obtained by
investigating a dataset combining results from the virological and
epidemiological surveillance systems which allowed the estimation
of a theoretic lower bound of the number of H1N1pdm infections
in Italy (see Text S1).
Finally, in order to increase model realism, a latent class of
individuals can be added to the proposed model. However, as
shown in Text S1, qualitative results do not substantially change:
model fit is still in excellent agreement with ILI incidence data.
This result confirms that the essential dynamics can be captured
by considering the SIR-version of the proposed model since the
latent period of influenza is quite short. Nonetheless, in other
contexts, the inclusion of a latent class may remarkably affect the
transmission dynamics.
As a matter of fact, if changes in human behavioral patterns
(such as self-protection) are not taken into account, two opposite
outcomes can be observed. Firstly, estimates of the growth rate
based on the observations during the early phases of the epidemic
may lead to an underestimation of the transmissibility potential of
the disease and thus to underrate the impact of the epidemic.
Secondly, predictions based on robust available estimates of the
reproductive number (e.g., taken from the analysis in countries
where the epidemic is already well sustained) would lead to
overestimate the growth rate of the epidemic during its early
phases, resulting in turn in predicting a faster spread than the
actual one. For instance, by using a SIR model, accounting for the
best parameter estimates as obtained by fitting the entire epidemic
but initializing the system with the actual number of cases at the
beginning of autumn 2009 (namely on week 38), the simulations
reach the epidemic peak four weeks in advance with respect to the
actual pandemic (see Fig. 3). A similar result has been observed
also in [30], where - using a model not accounting for behavioral
changes in the population - the epidemic peak has been predicted
two weeks in advance with respect to the actual value.
Discussion
A high level of the perceived risk at the beginning of the 2009–
10 pandemic is largely suspected, as well as its effect in slowing the
epidemic spread. Our aim here is to validate this hypothesis by
showing that spontaneous behavioral changes in the population
might have played a central role in the early phases of the
pandemic in Italy. Specifically, ILI incidence shows a low (though
exponential) growth, followed by a sudden change in its growth
rate starting from week 42. Such pattern can hardly be captured
by classical models. On the contrary, the proposed approach is
able to reproduce it by explicitly modeling spontaneous behavioral
changes in the population. Our analysis is supported by some
empirical evidence (e.g., the purchase of antiviral drugs) and
reveals that a high perceived initial risk of infection could be a
plausible explanation for such phenomenon.
This study represents a first step for the estimation of the
quantitative and qualitative effects of spontaneous behavioral
changes in the population on the spread of epidemics. We believe
it provides a promising approach, based on evolutionary game
theory, for including the behavior dynamics into epidemic
transmission models. The proposed approach is general enough
to be used for describing any kind of disease where spontaneous
behavioral changes could play a relevant role. Similar approaches
have been previously used to investigate individual choices in non-
compulsory vaccination programs [42,44,57–59].
As shown in this study, behavioral changes (e.g. induced by
mass media information campaigns) can significantly affect the
epidemic spread both qualitatively (e.g., by altering the epidemic
dynamics) and quantitatively (e.g., by substantially slowing the
epidemic spread or by determining different final epidemic sizes).
Therefore, considering an approach accounting for spontaneous
behavioral changes would be helpful for giving insight to public
health policy makers, for planning public health control strategies
(e.g., vaccination) and better estimating the burden for health care
centers over time. Moreover, this study highlights that the
estimation of fundamental epidemiological parameters (and in
particular the reproductive number) could be largely affected by
human behaviors.
At the current stage, the proposed model could hardly be used
for real time predictions since our knowledge on plausible values of
model parameters related to human behavior is only preliminary.
Figure 3. The impact of risk perception. Weekly ILI incidence as
reported to the surveillance system (green) and incidence simulated by
the model (red; parameter values as in Fig. 1c). Weekly incidence
simulated by the ‘‘classical’’ SIR model (blue; parameter values as in
Fig. 1a but for I(0)~0:001243).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0016460.g003
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other countries or on other epidemics where behavioral changes
have been suspected (e.g., the 2002–03 SARS outbreak) have to be
performed in order to gain a major consciousness on how such
mechanisms work.
Supporting Information
Text S1 In this appendix model derivation and its SEIR
variant are presented along with an in-depth sensitivity
analysis. Moreover, an investigation of past influenza seasons
and of virological surveillance data is carried out.’’
(PDF)
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